The issue
Monitoring the research activities of the major companies is a burdensome but useful task.
Technological change, rather than manna from heaven, is the outcome of the intentional efforts of "flesh and body" private and public organisations. Since the largest firms undertake the bulk of a country's business research, a continuous inspection of their R&D expenditures should become customary for economists and policy makers.
From a private perspective, large companies should invest a stable share of their current revenues on R&D in order to sustain their future stream of revenues. From a social point of view, this implies a significant presence of big (industrial) R&D laboratories which, along with obvious direct benefits for the hosting country, generate positive economic externalities (fruitful co-operation with university research, attraction of outstanding scientists and engineers as well as high-tech foreign direct investments, high-tech spin-offs).
Among the largest European companies (or industrial groups), those supplying public utilities (telecommunication services, electricity generation and distribution, gas provision) play a remarkable role. A recent study of the European Commission (2005) provides sales data for 700 major EU companies in 2004: among the first eighteen (all with more than € 40 billion of sales) there are seven utility companies. Thus, in spite of the ongoing process of liberalisation (much more advanced in TLC than energy), the EU utility markets are still dominated by very big players (mostly private entities).
During the last decade, national and European regulation and competition authorities have monitored the behaviour of these dominant firms with a view to favour the entry of new competitors, avoid excessive prices for final customers and maintain the quality of services. In this ongoing process of liberalisation, little or no attention has been put on the research activities of the major utility companies of Europe. After all, in presence of greater competition (stemming from new entrants as well as the possibility of extending their business over national borders), why these companies should have dropped their R&D expenditures? Actually, this is what occurred in the first half of the 2000s. Obviously, not all the companies under consideration behaved symmetrically, but most of them (and especially the electricity and gas providers) decreased substantially their R&D investment. At current prices (that is neglecting inflation) their total R&D expenditures in the 2000-01 biennium amounted to € 4.5 billion per year while in 2004-05 they became € 3 billion (a reduction of 33%). Their sales, instead, increased from 411 to 440 billions so that, as a whole, the biggest European utility companies diminished their R&D intensity (on sales) from 1.1 to 0.7%. This note aims primarily at stimulating the attention of European policy markers who, with respect to the above phenomenon, have shown little or no concern. Investors and financial analysts are mainly interested in the short-run profitability of these companies (listed in the major stock exchanges of the world) and this can explain the negligence of newspapers and economic magazines. Instead, the absence of reactions from national political bodies, regulation authorities and the European Commission is hardly justifiable. The EC, in particular, is responsible for monitoring the progress made in pursuing the Lisbon goals among which -as targeted in the 2002 Barcelona European Council -there is that of reaching, for the whole EU in 2010, a 3% share of R&D expenditures on GDP with two thirds of them funded by the private sector. How can this goal be achieved if some of the largest European industrial groups reduce their R&D investment? By evoking corporate responsibility, why the major utility companies should not contribute to the economic progress of the EU?
After describing the processes of data collection and companies' selection (section 2), this note offers a comparative analysis of EU company data for electricity and gas (section 3), telecommunication services (section 4) and aggregate public utilities (section 5). A discussion of the findings is contained in the final section.
The data
Data on sales and R&D expenditures are taken from the consolidated group accounts provided by the ultimate parent companies in their audited annual reports (downloadable from their web sites).
In most cases I also checked the Forms 20-F compiled by the companies for the US Security and Exchange Commission in which, for the sake of transparency, the R&D section is indexed. When both are available (that is almost always) the Form F-20 and the annual report indicate the same R&D spending. Although the EU companies are not compelled to disclose their R&D investment, most of them do, and this also occurs with utility companies. Two relevant exceptions are Endesa and Gas Natural SDG, both Spanish companies 2 : the first is one of the largest electrical companies in the world and the biggest electricity provider in Spain; the second is the major natural gas supplier of the same country.
Along with those of Spain, but for quite different reasons, UK-based electricity and gas companies are not included in the analysis; in fact, thanks to the advanced process of liberalisation, none of them owns a dominant position and records an amount of sales comparable to that of the largest utility companies of Europe. To be added is that among the major players in the UK energy markets there are many foreign companies (such as EdF, RWE and E.ON) which, instead, are taken into account.
Due to their relative low level of sales, all the utility companies based on EU countries other than
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, are not considered in the present note.
With respect to the sectoral grouping, because of the presence of many multi-utility companies, electricity and gas companies are put together under the "energy" label.
Another problem is that of two big energy providers, ENI and Suez, which derive a remarkable portion of their revenues from oil extraction and refinement and the distribution of related products.
In these two cases, only the sales referring to gas and electricity are taken into account and, consequently, only a fraction of their total R&D expenditures is considered in line with the share of energy on total sales. With this procedure, the R&D investment of ENI and Suez is likely to be overestimated. In general, for a few other dubious cases (namely, when the R&D investment was missing or inconsistent for only one year) the same strategy, favourable to an overestimation, has been followed. 
The electricity and gas companies
The R&D performance of energy companies over 2000-05 is illustrated in Table 1 . It can be examined by looking either at their current R&D expenditures and R&D intensity on sales. To be stressed is that, over the same period, only the two German companies -E.ON and RWErecorded a reduction of sales of around 30% while all the others had remarkable increases ranging from 21% of ENEL to 57% of Gaz de France. As a consequence, the ratio between R&D investment and sales declined substantially in all the major energy companies of Europe, included
EdF and ENI (-20%) although the reduction of the others was by far much intense (from -49% of Gaz de France to -89% of E.ON). Among the five companies, only Telecom Italia had a small reduction of sales (-2.5%) over the period considered, while in the other cases there was a significant rise, especially for Deutsche and France Telecom (+32 and +25% respectively).
The telecom companies
As a result, all the major companies but France Telecom decreased their R&D intensity on sales with a minimum of -10% (Telecom Italia) to a maximum of -52% (Deutsche Telekom).
3 To my request, a responsible of DT investor relations said that the changes in the reported R&D figures are due to different accounting methods. However, the data on R&D employees -consistently defined in the various annual reports as those " involved in projects and activities aimed at creating new products and marketing them to customers" -indicate that the staggering R&D drop of DT was real and cannot be entirely ascribed to changes in accounting procedures. 
Summing up
To provide a global picture of the recent R&D behaviour of the largest European utility companies, I summed up their sales and R&D expenditures. Table 3 shows the results for energy, telecom and total utilities, while a graphical representation of R&D intensity trends is depicted in figure 1 .
Overall, as compared to a small increase of sales (+7%), there has been a 37% reduction of R&D investment at current prices: as a consequence, the EU utility companies as a whole recorded a 41% decrease of their R&D intensity.
The R&D reduction was particularly severe in the electricity and gas sector in which about 60% of the expenditures reported in the initial biennium vanished. In presence of an almost constant level of sales, the R&D intensity of energy companies decreased by the same percentage. Considering its higher level of technological opportunities as well as its sales' increase (+18%), also the performance of the telecom sector is quite disappointing: the R&D expenditures of telecom companies dropped by 22% while their R&D intensity on sales by 34%. The different technological opportunities between energy and telecom companies are well depicted by figure 1 in which the former systematically display a lower intensity of R&D spending. The same figure is also useful to stress that the decline in R&D intensity over 2000-05 was an almost continuous phenomenon although, for energy companies, it significantly accelerated in 2003.
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Discussion
In this concluding section, the above findings are discussed in the light of some possible objections.
A first one is that the R&D drop by utility companies is a recent phenomenon and, as such, it could be transitory and reversible. This argument is at odds with the available evidence indicating that the R&D reduction started well before 2000, pushed by the privatisation of previously state-owned companies and the deregulation (or liberalisation) of utility markets.
According to Florio (2004;  But aside from the records of individual companies, in the case of "energy R&D" a marked decrease was patent since the early 1990s. Dooley (1998) has shown that this occurred in many developed countries (with the exception of Japan) and it was mainly due to the behaviour of energy companies (some already private, others aware of their future privatisation): in some countries (such as the UK and the Nordic European countries) they already operated in deregulated markets, while in others (US, Germany and Italy) they were moving in the same direction. As a result, most energy companies reduced R&D investments by refocusing their innovative strategies towards short-term, customer-oriented goals. The latter have little to do with the long-term goal of guaranteeing the future supply of cheaper and cleaner energy, crucial for the economic prospects of a country. The conclusion was that "long-term energy R&D […] is unlikely to be supported by individual utilities in a competitive, deregulated utility market" (Dooley, 1998., p. 554) . Unfortunately, only with the exception of Electricité de France, this prediction is confirmed by the recent performances of the largest energy companies of Europe.
It is likely that the R&D behaviour of European telecom companies can be ascribed to a shift of corporate strategy similar to that stressed for energy companies (more emphasis on short-term goals and customers' needs, less attention on the efficiency of telecom infrastructures). However, before adopting the same interpretation, it would be necessary to collect a number of consistent pieces of evidence which, at present, are not available.
Another relevant issue is whether the R&D disengagement of utility companies is really important for European countries. To answer, I first assumed that these companies had maintained over by the twelve companies considered in this note, there would have been an increase of 15.3%. At a first sight, the difference seems modest but it is instead quite relevant if one considers the small R&D increases experienced by EU countries during the last years (see Eurostat, 2005a ). The conclusion that can be drawn from the above exercise is that, with a declining contribution of its largest utility companies, the EU cannot improve substantially its R&D intensity. Obviously, the situation is not the same across countries: French utility companies, on average, performed much better than their German counterparts. However, since the major companies operate in many
European markets, the issue should not be left to national policy makers alone.
It must be stressed that, with respect to this phenomenon, the usual political reaction in Europe has been that of resignation, as if the R&D cuts of the largest utility companies were more irreversible than climate changes. Take, as an example, a period extracted from a note of the UK Parliament on electricity networks:
"Newer technologies offer the hope for cost-effective and environmental less damaging forms of electricity generation, but since privatisation, investment by the Electricity Supply Industry in research and development (R&D) has dropped significantly. R&D in electricity network has been especially poorly served. Recognising this, the Government provides direct R&D support and is seeking to encourage firms to innovate in this area" (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2001, p. 4) .
A further quotation can be found in a report of an European research network composed of recently established R&D agencies working in the electricity field:
"With the liberalisation, the Utility companies, who previously funded much of the research in the electricity sector in-house, have reduced their R&D expenditure. As such, […] , funding has become available at national level through various Ministries and Government Agencies in these liberalised markets" (ENIRDGnet, 2004, p. 4) .
Thus, if private utility companies invest less in R&D, the only thing that can be done is to increase public R&D. Against this argument two main objections can be raised. First, it is not necessary to be an expert of technology for understanding that public R&D cannot be a substitute for private R&D; at best, they complement each other. In other words, technological excellence requires the presence of both public and industrial R&D laboratories with the former more devoted to the "R"
(or to basic research) and the latter more involved in the "D" component. Secondly, due to the budget constraints of European national governments, it is unlikely that public funds may replace the amount of R&D dropped by utility companies 5 .
In this respect, the Italian case for electricity provides a good example. Historically, ENEL funded and conducted research for the national electricity system. After the 1999 privatisation, a governmental decree established that CESI (a corporate company) was responsible for this task and ENEL transferred to it all the related R&D facilities and personnel. After that, the system research The Italian electricity story is also useful to contrast the idea that most private utility companies are not less innovative than before but, instead of performing R&D activities in-house, have simply chosen to outsource them to private companies and/or public agencies. The better counter-argument I found with respect to this objection is taken from an inquiry carried out in 1999 by the Parliament of Australia 6 :
"While outsourcing has its benefits it can exacerbate problems mentioned earlier, such as the move away from long-term R&D -as utilities which outsource R&D tend to focus on short-term projects. The critical mass for R&D can also be affected by outsourcing and downsizing on former centres of excellence, with experts either leaving the field or being distributed over a number of service providers. There are also suggestions that outsourcing can favour overseas R&D providers" (Parliament of Australia -House of Representatives, 1999, p. xxii).
To be noticed is that the "critical mass" argument is consistent with that introduced in the introductory section of this note, stressing that the presence of big industrial R&D laboratories provides strong economic advantages to the hosting countries.
A final objection is that the R&D decline in utilities is common to all the developed countries of the world. This is true, but the existing evidence indicates that the problem is much more severe in
Europe. According to the last edition of the EC study on company R&D (2005), also the non-EU companies active in telecommunication services and electricity -mainly based in Japan and South Korea 7 -experienced a significant decrease of R&D investment. However, their reduction of R&D expenditures at current prices over 2001-04 was only 0.2% in telecommunication and 9.4% in electricity; in the same sectors, during 2003-04, their average R&D intensity on sales was respectively 2 and 0.9%. Considering the same years, the debacle of the major European utilities is not comparable: R&D expenditures diminished by 19% in telecommunication and 58% in energy while R&D intensities were, respectively, 1.3 and 0.4% (for these computations see table 3 ).
In conclusion, it is difficult to find convincing arguments that can justify (or reduce the concerns about) the poor R&D performance of the largest European utility companies. I think that, both at the EU and national level, governments and regulation authorities should put this problem on their agendas and react with appropriate measures.
